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Abstract 
Amazon Mechanical Turk (MTurk) allows organizations and individuals to benefit from a collective source 
of intelligence, skills and insights from a global population, but MTurk withdraws from responsibilities and 
the obligation of overlooking payment transactions. Consequently, there is no contractual agreement 
between the crowd worker and the requester on when payments should be authorized. Requesters even 
obtain ownership of the work without having to pay for it. This situation of lock-up poses a serious issue for 
crowd workers. As a solution to this problem, the present study introduces smart contracts to transactions 
on crowd work platforms, arguing that smart contracts can mitigate risks from lock-up situations and 
support trust, through non-alterable terms and conditions imprinted into the code of a smart contract. This 
research conceptualizes an online experimental study to validate the trust building and risk mitigating 
effects of smart contracts in crowd work transactions on Amazon Mechanical Turk. 
Keywords 
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Introduction 
Amazon Mechanical Turk (MTurk) is a marketplace for businesses and individuals to crowdsource 
processes and jobs online. Tasks include conducting simple data validation and research to survey 
participation and further. MTurk therefore allows its users to benefit from a collective source of intelligence, 
skills and insights from a global population (Amazon Mechanical Turk, Inc. 2020). On MTurk, complex 
problems are broken down into more manageable micro-tasks, called Human-Intelligence Tasks (HITs). 
HITs are published by requesters and crowd workers complete these tasks over the Internet. As requesters 
need to check the quality of the work before authorizing remuneration, crowd workers need to trust in 
receiving payment from the requester after a HIT is processed. In a traditional client-contractor-
relationship, the client would give the job to one contractor after analyzing its trustworthiness. This trust 
management is not possible on crowd work platforms as requesters may give micro-tasks to thousands of 
crowd workers, which could behave dishonestly, i.e. by delivering low quality or wrong results (Yu et al. 
2012). MTurk hereby withdraws from the obligation of overlooking the payment transaction and 
responsibilities, giving requesters the possibility to reject decent work (Amazon Mechanical Turk, Inc. 
2020; Deng et al. 2016; Gol et al. 2019a). Moreover, requesters obtain the ownership of completed work, 
even if they did not pay for it, which may lead to unethical behavior of requesters. Crowd workers on the 
other hand, do not have any possibility to claim the payment (LaPlante and Silberman 2016). As a 
consequence, research shows that crowd workers allocate an average of 23.2% of their capacity on tasks 
without payment (Berg 2016). Consequently, crowd workers face inequality, are marginalized (Deng et al. 
2016) and still have to trust the requesters that the agreed conditions of payment are being met. As there is 
no contractual agreement between the crowd worker and the requester on when payments should be 
approved by the requester, this situation is of undetermined length and may last from only hours up to 30 
days (maximum time of the auto-approval setting on MTurk (Amazon Mechanical Turk, Inc. 2020)).  
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This phenomenon is commonly referred to as a lock-up situation. From a theoretical perspective, lock-up 
situations increase risk due to information asymmetry between the two parties on MTurk. The 
undetermined length of the lock-up period is hereby expected to be an amplifier to the risks, which result 
in blind trust being needed by the crowd worker on MTurk. Currently, the only indirect mitigation 
possibility for crowd workers are several forums (i.e. Turkopticon, Turker Nation, MTurk Forum, etc.) 
where workers can share information and experience regarding HITs and requesters (Gol et al. 2019b; Irani 
and Silberman 2013; LaPlante and Silberman 2016). One actual possibility as a countermeasure against 
lock-up risks would be smart contracts.  
Smart contracts were first formulated to conduct the full contractual procedure (agreement, monitoring 
and adjucation) without human or any third party intervention (Szabo 1997). After 2008 with the inception 
of Bitcoin and after 2013 with the success of Ethereum (Buterin 2014; Nakamoto 2008), smart contracts 
are commonly based on blockchain technology and are meant to link encoded contractual agreements, 
digital monitoring and real-world execution (Iansiti and Lakhani 2017; Werbach and Cornell 2017). In the 
context of transactions on MTurk, smart contracts are hypothesized to increase transparency by creating 
equal conditions in transactions between requester and crowd worker. Hence, we argue that smart contracts 
mitigate risks from lock-up periods and support trust through non-alterable terms and conditions, 
imprinted into the code of a smart contract. As a result, our research examines the following question:  
Do smart contracts in lock-up situations of undetermined length shape trust and risk perceptions on 
Amazon Mechanical Turk?  
In order to answer this question, we conceptualize an online experimental investigation into the interaction 
effects of smart contracts and lock-up situations employed for requester-crowd worker payment 
agreements on MTurk. By examining the influence of smart contracts on transaction risks and trust on 
MTurk, this study makes relevant contributions to crowd work literature in general and to literature on 
smart contracts and lock-ups in specific. Overall, we intend to lead the way for public contracting, and 
therefore to a smart-contract-augmented contract law regime (Halaburda et al. 2019). 
Amazon Mechanical Turk, Risk, Trust and Lock-Up Situations 
MTurk resembles an online platform, upon which third-party requesters broadcast HITs and external 
crowd workers complete these. From a requesters’ perspective, MTurk provides value by giving access to a 
global, on-demand 24x7 workforce completing thousands of HITs in a short period of time (Amazon 
Mechanical Turk, Inc. 2020; Brawley and Pury 2016). From a crowd workers’ perspective, MTurk offers a 
platform that enables its users to work from home and choose one’s own work hours and to get paid (Deng 
and Joshi 2016). The governance structure of MTurk is manifested by the terms and conditions of use within 
the participation agreement. Within these terms and conditions, MTurk declines all responsibility related 
to the transactions between requesters and workers in terms of quality, safety or payment issues (Bergvall-
Kåreborn and Howcroft 2014). MTurk additionally states that users’ engagement on the platform is at their 
own risk, and all work “is made for hire”, for the benefit of the requester (Bergvall-Kåreborn and Howcroft 
2014). This means, that there is no legal protection and any ownership or intellectual property rights reside 
with the requester (Amazon Mechanical Turk, Inc. 2020; Felstiner 2011; Newman 2019). The situation is 
further aggravated by the fact that once the crowd worker has been accepted for a HIT, it must be completed 
in a given timeframe. However, there is no timely limit for requesters evaluating and reimbursing the work. 
The “mandatory satisfaction” clause even gives the requester the authority to reject a HIT without 
justification (Brawley and Pury 2016; Deng et al. 2016). At the same time, the requester is able to access the 
work without forfeiting ownership (Amazon Mechanical Turk, Inc. 2020; Bergvall-Kåreborn and Howcroft 
2014). This lack of transparency raises exceptional ethical concerns and risks for crowd workers in ways 
that the crowd workers are unable to make judgements about the moral valence of their work (Zittrain 
2008). In addition, the time-period for reimbursement of the conducted work is unknown, a situation for 
the crowd worker that is commonly referred to as a lock-up situation.  
Little is known about lock-up situations in the relationship between requester and crowd worker on MTurk. 
Lock-ups have predominantly been studied in the context of contractually agreed lock-up periods of Initial 
Public Offerings, where the investor is restricted from selling her/his shares for a fixed period of time (Field 
and Hanka 2001; Garfinkle et al. 2002; Keasler 2001). The difference to lock-ups in the environment on 
MTurk is that the length of a lock-up is voluntarily set by requesters in the auto-approval settings, and may 
be extended up to 30 days. However, within this time-period, the requester may manually approve or reject 
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payments and hence decides whether the crowd worker will receive remuneration or not. This includes 
substantial risks as the crowd worker must trust in the benevolence of the requester. 
In conclusion, ethical considerations on crowd working platforms, are about the borderless nature which 
results in the fact, that crowd employment platforms are largely hidden from legislation or regulation 
(Felstiner 2011). As a result, lock-up periods cause increased risk and trust discrepancies in requester- 
crowd worker transactions. 
Smart Contracts 
Smart contracts were first formulated by Szabo in 1997. At the time, the author envisioned the full cycle of 
a contract, including the search, performance and adjucation to be handled by hardware and software 
without human interaction. Smart contracts are defined as “(…) automatically executable agreements 
between parties based on predefined codified criteria” - (Halaburda et al. 2019, p.2).  
In 2008, blockchain technology became popular through the BitCoin white paper, written by Nakamoto 
(2008). Leveraging the benefits of blockchain technology, users were encouraged to develop contracting 
platforms for automatic execution of digitally encoded contractual terms outside the BitCoin system  
(Werbach and Cornell 2017). Inspired by the shortcomings of BitCoin, Vitalik Buterin developed the 
Ethereum blockchain platform in 2013 (Buterin 2014). Ethereum was the first platform to allow the 
development of diverse blockchain applications like for example smart contracts (Iansiti and Lakhani 2017). 
From the moment of inception of the Ethereum platform, increased use of digital data inputs to monitor 
contracts took place (Iansiti and Lakhani 2017). In addition, monitoring can be directly tied to contractual 
terms and execution without dispute. In smart contracts, once the agreements are made, contractual terms 
are inalterable and transactions will be executed automatically if all prerequisites are met (Halaburda et al. 
2019). Therefore, the adoption of well-designed smart contracts yields improvements in terms of reduced 
contract monitoring costs such as costs of renegotiation of contractual terms (Halaburda et al. 2019).  
In the context of crowd work platforms, which do not offer a contractual agreement between requester and 
crowd worker (i.e. MTurk), smart contracts represent a platform-independent solution for both parties to 
define the expected work quality as well as a resulting payment security. Therefore, smart contracts close 
the trust discrepancy between both parties and ensure that the requester will get exactly the work outcome 
s/he expects and the crowd worker will get the payment if s/he delivers the work as required. These 
automatically executable agreements build trust/reduce risk for both sides of the exchange by making them 
equal partners and reduce the effort for requesters to manually check the works’ quality. 
Hypotheses Development and Research Model 
Lock-up periods force crowd workers to advance their labor with non-regulated and insecure remuneration 
practices, enforced by the terms and conditions of the MTurk platform (Amazon Mechanical Turk, Inc. 
2020; Bergvall-Kåreborn and Howcroft 2014).  
Trust is defined by the function of the degree of risk inherent in a situation (Koller 1988). Because crowd 
workers are forced to fulfill their duty within a certain time frame and requesters are not, trust is being 
compromised by the discrepancy of regulatory and timely strictness between requesters and crowd workers. 
Trust is further aggravated by the fact that requesters are allowed to reject work on MTurk and still remain 
ownership of intellectual property rights (Amazon Mechanical Turk, Inc. 2020; Bergvall-Kåreborn and 
Howcroft 2014; Brawley and Pury 2016; Deng et al. 2016).  
Summarized, under such conditions, the crowd workers’ trust in the transaction is expected to decrease and 
perceived risk is expected to increase. Therefore, hypothesis 1 states the following: 
H1: Lock-up situations will decrease perceived trust and increase perceived risk compared to the situation 
without a lock-up.  
Smart contracts represent encoded terms and conditions that two parties agree on. Once implied, these 
terms and conditions are non-alterable and execution will take place automatically (Halaburda et al. 2019). 
Implying these inalterable self-executing contracts to transactions on MTurk that are characterized by lock-
up periods, risk perceptions of crowd workers are expected to decrease and trust is hypothesized to increase. 
For this reason, hypotheses 2 a and 2 b state the following:  
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H2-a: Smart contracts will shape trust perceptions from lock-up situations, leading to increased 
perceptions of trust, when a lock-up is present.  
H2-b: Smart contracts will moderate risks from lock-up situations, leading to decreased perceptions of 





Figure 1. Conceptual research model 
Methodology 
Procedure: The four groups of the online experiment include two varying versions of lock-ups. Scenario 
one will present the crowd workers with a lock-up situation, in which the crowd worker has to finish a task 
within a set time period but the requester will not have a deadline for reviewing and remunerating the work. 
The no lock-up situation on the other hand, is created by a short deadline for both (e.g. 24-48 hours), the 
crowd worker and the requester. The crowd workers have to finish their task and the requesters need to 
review and remunerate the work in time. Scenario three and four will also include a lock-up and no lock-up 
situation but will additionally present a smart contract for the crowd worker and the requester, including 
its terms and conditions. The dependent variables of trust (McKnight et al. 2002) and risk (Keil et al. 2000) 
perceptions will be measured via established multi-item constructs. The complexity of the task will be 
controlled. 
Data Collection: Data will be collected with crowd workers from the MTurk platform. We will ensure 
validity of the experimental design by conducting manipulation checks. Attention checks throughout the 
experimental procedure will assure that participants respond to the questions thoughtfully. 
Expected Findings, Discussion and Future Research 
Based on the results of the online experiment, we expect to find that lock-ups yield a negative effect on the 
dependent variables due to trust asymmetries and risk perceptions of crowd workers.  
Smart contracts on the other hand, are expected to mitigate risk perceptions through creation of equally 
applicable terms and conditions for the requester and the crowd worker. The smart contract is hereby 
expected to take on the role of a reliable, third party regulating instance. With this technical attribute, crowd 
workers are receiving their funds if the work has been conducted to the agreed level of quality. This will be 
the case independent of any fraudulent intentions of requesters. To receive work without paying will not be 
possible anymore, which in turn increases trust and reduces risk for both parties through increased 
transparency and comprehensible execution of terms and conditions via a smart contract.  
Our work illustrates the relevance of exploring technical lock-up situations and their interactions with smart 
contracts. Specifically, we demonstrate how smart contracts as a regulatory technology, shape risk 
perceptions and trust from lock-up situations on MTurk, where crowd workers find themselves dependent 
on the goodwill of a requester and do not seldomly miss out major parts of their income. This highlights the 
need for research on solutions to this problem. Smart contracts serving as self-regulating and executing 
instance in crowd work transactions could embody a regulatory third party to increase transparency, trust 
and to reduce risks. Future research is therefore clearly recommended to investigate the trust building and 
risk mitigating effects of smart contracts in combination with lock-up situations. 
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